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ARTICLES INSPIRED BY
THE WORK OF JOHN M. PAYNE
MOUNT LAUREL: HINDSIGHT IS 20-20
Richard H. Chused*
The New Jersey Supreme Court is justifiably famous for its
decisions in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel--commonly known as Mount Laurel I and Mount
Laurel ILl Its valiant efforts to reform zoning practices in the state
led to reconfiguration of both state and local land use regimes in New
Jersey, and provided a model used by other jurisdictions confronting
similar issues.2 As a New Jersey-based land use professor, John
Payne took on the lifelong task of chronicling, critiquing and writing
about Mount Laurel.3 Under the circumstances it would be
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Before joining the Georgetown
University Law Center faculty in 1973, Professor Chused taught at Rutgers School of
Law-Newark for five years. He participated in the faculty meeting at which John
Payne was voted an offer to teach at Rutgers, and was his colleague until departing for
Georgetown. Chused moved from Georgetown to New York Law School in 2008. He
extends his gratitude to New York Law School for supporting his work on this essay
with a summer writer's grant.
1. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975). The court revisited the dispute and issued an exhaustive evaluation of
the issues in 1983. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel
II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). Five other cases spawned by the initial result in Mount
Laurel I were consolidated when the New Jersey Supreme Court heard the second
round of the case in 1983.
2. Examples include New York, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire. See National
Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965); Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1975); Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H.
1991). A summary of results around the nation may be found in 13 RICHARD R.
POWELL & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §79D-07 (2010).
3. Unfortunately, John died much too young of brain cancer in 2009. His long
period of service to both New Jersey and Rutgers led to his being named a Board of
Governors Distinguished Service Professor in 2004. Some of his work relevant to this
essay includes, John M. Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government
Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976); John M.
Payne, From the Courts: Starting Over-Mount Laurel II, 12 REAL EST. L. J. 85 (1983);
John M. Payne, Housing Rights and Remedies: A "Legislative" History of Mount Laurel
II, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 889 (1984); John M. Payne, From the Courts: Mount Laurel
Goes National, 15 REAL ESTATE L. J. 62 (1986); John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share:
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sacrilegious for a long-time property teacher like me to write for a
festschrift honoring John's life without taking a new look at the case
he spent so much time on. So I sat down and reread the Mount
Laurel opinions, a host of related cases and legislative enactments,
literature and other commentary and came to the "hindsight is 20-
20" conclusion that the case was, in significant ways, wrongly
decided. This essay tells you why.
I. JUST A BIT OF BACKGROUND
Summarizing the Mount Laurel dispute is impossible. The two
main opinions are the size of a major book. Adding in all the related
cases would fill a multi-volume set. Legislative responses were
complicated and lengthy.4 The literature on the dispute is massive.
Payne himself provided the best picture of the extraordinary scale of
the litigation in a little piece describing the scene at the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1980 when it went over the issues for a second
time-hearing arguments in six consolidated, multi-party cases.
The October argument was as much a landmark in the annals of
American legal process as the subsequent decision itself. Because
individual presentations by all the parties would have been
hopelessly unwieldy (four pages were required to list the attorney
appearances in the final opinion), the parties were required by the
court to form themselves into interest groups (towns, developers,
and poor people) and only one attorney was permitted speak, for
the entire group, to any given portion of the twenty-four questions
[under review]. A formal outline of the program, with designated
speakers and time limitations, was presented to each visitor upon
arrival, as at the opera. Under the ground rules ... each speaker
was bound to address the general question, rather than to advocate
the facts or law of his or her clients' individual position.
The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL ESTATE L. J. 20
(1987); John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount Laurel: Is Affordable Housing Fair
Housing?, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 361 (1988); John M. Payne, From the Courts: Beyond
Mount Laurel, 16 REAL ESTATE L. J. 349 (1988); John M. Payne, From the Courts:
Exclusionary Zoning and the "Chester Doctrine," 20 REAL ESTATE L. J. 366 (1992);
John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel
Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665 (1996); John M. Payne,
Politics, Exclusionary Zoning and Robert Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 689 (1997); John
M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1685 (1998)
(book review); John M. Payne, General Welfare and Regional Planning: How the Law
of Unintended Consequences and the Mount Laurel Doctrine Gave New Jersey a
Modern State Plan, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1103 (1999); John M. Payne, Reconstructing
the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 555 (2000);
John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing Obligations: The Mount Laurel
Matrix, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365 (2001).
4. The Fair Share Housing Center website contains a brief and easy-to-read
summary of the litigation aftermath. See Mount Laurel Doctrine, FAIR SHARE HOUSING
CTR., http://fairsharehousing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
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The "argument" itself was as extraordinary as its setting.
Because virtually all the lawyers involved were intimately familiar
with the actual process of housing development, their arguments
had the feel of testimony at a legislative hearing, rather than
appellate advocacy. The members of the court in turn slipped
readily into the role of legislators, peppering the speakers with
well-informed questions to elicit facts (seldom law) about housing
economics and the mechanics of land development. One of the
twenty-four questions, for instance, asked that the parties discuss
the applicability of the "trickle down" theory of housing supply,
hardly a typical subject of courtroom debate.
5
This highly orchestrated but open-ended hearing occupied
eighteen and one-half hours, over a period of three and one-half days.
The court later held one more day of arguments, in which attorneys
who wished to do so could make traditional arguments on behalf of
their clients. The court then took the case under advisement, issuing
a book-length opinion three years later. Rather than attempt a
detailed description of this massive case, I've elected to provide just
enough background to create a picture of the original dispute and the
historical context in which it arose.
It is common knowledge that much of urban America was a
basket case when Mount Laurel I was argued in early 1974 and
decided just over a year later. There were many causes. Deeply
seated racial antagonism, the perceived benefits of single family
suburban housing, and the gradual decline of center cities led many
whites to leave their urban homes for new lives outside city cores.
6
Construction of the interstate highway system beginning in the
1950s made commuting to city jobs easy, and literally smoothed the
way for a nationwide middle class exodus to the suburbs. As people
moved out of cities, jobs followed. Traditionally urban manufacturing
jobs not only relocated to large factories in the suburbs, but also to
sites overseas that promised lower wage costs. Racial tension grew as
lingering, entrenched, white political structures held on to power in
the cities, sometimes with unsavory tactics.7 By 1970, urban centers
were left with fewer people, reduced employment opportunities, more
poverty, lower tax bases, inferior educational systems, abandoned
housing, empty office buildings, and financial nightmares. Countless
5. John M. Payne, From the Courts: Starting Over-Mount Laurel II, 12 REAL
EST. L. J. 85, 87-88 (1983).
6. The scope and depth of racial discrimination operating in the real estate
industry during the middle decades of the twentieth century cannot be
underestimated. The classic history is KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985). Recent work has added to our
depth of knowledge of the era. E.g., DAVID M. P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE
POLICY & WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007).
7. FREUND, supra note 6, at 4.
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great metropolises-major, historically important places such as New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Cleveland, Pittsburgh,
Detroit, Chicago and St. Louis, as well as a host of smaller cities and
towns-fell on hard times, from which many still have not recovered.
The urban disturbances of the late 1960s were the straw that broke
the camel's back for many areas.8 Though middle- and upper-class
whites, businesses, and investors had been leaving cities for quite
some time, the shift accelerated after 1965.9
New Jersey, of course, was hardly immune from these
cataclysmic demographic and economic shifts. Newark was especially
hard hit. The once-vibrant city-the cultural and commercial center
of New Jersey-deteriorated with remarkable rapidity. Reminders of
its once-storied past still are capable of surprising my young
contemporaries-a wonderful art museum,lo a once-grand library
system,11 great architecture,12 a vibrant downtown business district,
and, if you look carefully, beautiful residential areas. Its overall
population fell thirteen percent between 1950 and 1970.13 Subgroup
8. The long term impacts of the riots on both people and urban environments
were quite pronounced. See, e.g., William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, The Labor
Market Effects of the 1960s Riots, Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion Paper
No. 2026 (2003), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edulhier/2003papers/
2003list.html; William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, The Economic Aftermath of the
1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence From Property Values Vanderbilt Working
Paper No. 04-W1O (2004), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edulEcon/wparchive/
workpaper/vu04-w10.pdf.
9. FREUND, supra note 6, at 328-29.
10. See NEWARK MUSEUM, http://www.newarkmuseum.org/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
11. The grandeur of the main library building at 5 Washington Street suggests the
wealth that helped build the city. A picture of the structure is available on the City of
Newark's website. See Newark Library, CITY OF NEWARK, http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/
residents/places.activities/place_3.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
12. The city maintains a list of interesting and important buildings in its website.
See Historical Landmarks, CITY OF NEWARK, http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/visitors/
landmarks.points of oten.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
13. Census data presents the following picture of migration into and out of
Newark.
Newark White % % Decline Non-WhiteYear Population Population Population in White Population
White Population
1950 438,776 363,149 82.8% 75,627
1960 405,220 265,889 65.6% 26.8% 139,331
1970 382,417 168,382 44.0% 36.7% 214,035
1980 329,248 101,417 30.8% 39.8% 227,831
1990 275,221 78,771 28.6% 22.3% 196,450
2000 273,546 72,490 26.5% 8.0% 201,056
The Star-Ledger maintains an excellent website on the city and the 1967 riot. See
Newark 1967 Riots Anniversary from the Star-Ledger, NJ.COM, http://www.nj.com/
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trends were much more dramatic. In only twenty years the city was
transformed from a majority white to a majority black metropolis-
the white population of Newark declined 54 percent, while the non-
white population increased by 183 percent.14 The huge movements of
people out of and into the city caused remarkable changes in
commuting patterns and job locations, a major decline in the number
of middle-class residents and resident property owners, and
extensive disruptions in the structure of urban life. As middle-class
whites left, they were not replaced by groups capable of buying up all
property available for purchase, maintaining old businesses, and
creating a comprehensive structure of social and economic life
designed for the needs of the new residents. Social service
organizations, non-profit support groups, religious institutions, and
other establishments closed and were not always replaced. As George
Sternlieb summarized the situation in his classic study, The
Tenement Landlord, the decline in Newark's housing stock was due
in significant part to the decline of resident ownership of leasehold
property.15
The enormous range of challenges looming over cities across New
Jersey was the subject of reports issued by two commissions in
1968-The Kerner Commission Report,16 released by the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders convened by President
Johnson to study the barrage of riots that occurred between 1965 and
1967, and the Report for Action,17 the observations of the Governor's
newarkl967/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). The website also contains an interesting set of
demographic maps. See Newark Demographics 1960-2000, NJ.cOM,
http://www.nj.cominewarkl967/demographics/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
14. See Census Table, supra note 15.
15. Sternlieb noted:
[T]here is no question of the significance of landlord residence, particularly
single-parcel landlords, as insurance of property maintenance of slum
tenements. Given the priority accorded by multiple-parcel owners to tenant
problems as an inhibitor [to upkeep], . . . the lack of feeling on this score by
resident landlords, coupled with their good record in maintenance, is most
significant. It is the resident landlord, and only the resident landlord, who is
in a position to properly screen and supervise his tenantry. No one-shot wave
of maintenance and paint up-sweep up campaign can provide the day-to-day
maintenance which is required in slum areas. Given the relatively small size
of Newark tenement units, and others like them, this can only be
accomplished by a resident landlord. The record of these landlords . . . is
such as to inspire confidence in their future behavior on this score.
GEORGE STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 228 (1966) (emphasis omitted); see also
GEORGE STERNLIEB & ROBERT W. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE
TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED (1973) (follow-up study to THE TENEMENT
LANDLORD).
16. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
[hereinafter 1968 REPORT].
17. GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER: STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
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Select Commission on Civil Disorder in the State of New Jersey. The
Kerner Commission studied in depth the situations in Detroit and
New Jersey-sites of two of the worst outbursts of urban disorder.18
Both the Kerner and New Jersey reports voiced concerns about
strained relationships between largely white police departments and
residents of black communities, poor housing conditions, demolitions
and neighborhood disruptions caused by slum clearance and highway
construction programs, unemployment, failing schools, inadequate
health care, the commonly articulated view that courts treated black
people and the poor unfairly, and the continuing impact of white
racism. The Kerner Commission executive summary contained the
now-famous warning: "This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is
moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and
unequal."19 There also was evidence that riots were most intense in
areas where economic inequality and political unresponsiveness were
moderate rather than severe problems,20 and that those participating
in the riots tended to be employed, lower-class residents-people who
had begun to climb up the economic ladder but were frustrated by
lack of continued progress in both the civil rights movement and the
well-being of the black community.21
It was quite evident in the late 1960s that the urban centers of
New Jersey and other states were in grave difficulty. There was a
widespread sense, both locally and nationally, that corrective action
was needed. Whether that sense arose from qualms about the
likelihood of further riots or earnest desires to alleviate serious
grievances made little difference. For a short time period,
legislatures adopted significant reforms and some courts added their
voices to the calls for change.22 Congress created the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) in 196423 as part of President
Johnson's War on Poverty and passed laws protecting civil rights in
REPORT FOR ACTION (1968).
18. In addition to Newark, the commission investigated events in northern New
Jersey, Plainfield, and New Brunswick. 1968 REPORT, supra note 16, at 56-84.
19. Id. at 1.
20. See, e.g., Gregg Lee Carter, The 1960s Black Riots Revisited: City Level
Explanations of Their Severity, 56 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 210 (1986).
21. See, e.g., John Herbers, Study Says Negro Justifies Rioting as Social Protest;
Report Compiled for Panel on Civil Disorders Finds Noncriminals Take Part, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1968, at Al.
22. Perhaps the most important example was the deluge of cases that emerged
after 1970 providing implied warranty defenses in landlord-tenant courts. The three
most prominent of those cases were Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 263 N.E.2d 833 (Ill.
1970), Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and
Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970).
23. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964).
818 [Vol. 63:3
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1964,24 1965,25 and 1968.26 Head Start and the National Legal
Services program were two of many local, community-based projects
funded by OEO. It was in this atmosphere that groups concerned
about the advancing state of urban decay began to meet, talk and
strategize about needed reforms in an array of areas-schools, police
departments, courts used by the poor, taxation systems, and, of
course, land use policy.
Discussions about land use focused on an interlinking set of
problems involving race, poverty, taxation, and local control.
Unfortunately-at least in hindsight-the discourse concentrated
much more on making the suburbs more accessible to blacks and the
poor, than on enticing middle-class citizens to the cities.27 Given the
forces at work, that focus was not surprising. The overlapping issues
of race and poverty drove much of the policy debate among those
working to ameliorate urban deterioration in the 1960s and 1970s.
Racially segregated housing patterns were a fixture of American life
throughout the twentieth century. Racial zoning statutes, invalidated
by the Supreme Court in 1917,28 were passed in a number of cities
and towns early in the century. Restrictive covenants were
commonplace until their invalidation in 1948,29 but their legal
demise did not end residential segregation. Red-lining, restrictive
loan practices, segregated public housing, discrimination in the real
estate brokerage business and an array of other practices continued
to restrain racial integration well after World War 11.30 Even after
1968, when such practices became subject to judicial oversight as a
result of the Supreme Court's reinvigoration of post-Civil War civil
rights acts and Congress's adoption of fair housing legislation,31
24. Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
25. Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
26. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
27. I am not claiming any personal prescience. My teaching and scholarly activities
after joining the Rutgers faculty in 1968 tilted the same way. The clinical teaching
work I did with Professors Frank Askin and Alfred Blumrosen in the Administrative
Process Project was designed to increase the presence of minority residents in the
suburbs. The reports issued on the project make this quite clear. See ALFRED
BLUMROSEN, FRANK ASKIN & RICHARD CHUSED, ENFORCING EQUALITY IN HOUSING
AND EMPLOYMENT THROUGH STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS (1971); ALFRED BLUMROSEN,
FRANK ASKIN & RICHARD CHUSED, ENFORCING FAIR HOUSING LAWS: APARTMENTS IN
WHITE SUBURBIA (1970).
28. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
29. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1948).
30. See JACKSON, supra note 6.
31. The Court in Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), approved congressional
power to adopt civil rights acts controlling private discriminatory actions under the
Thirteenth Amendment. For the civil rights legislation, see Fair Housing Act, Pub. L.
90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
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change was very slow in coming.32
But once overtly race-based zoning schemes, covenants, and
housing policies were invalidated, land use issues of necessity took on
a different cast. Local zoning authorities exercised more restraint in
their use of racial discourse in land use planning meetings. Suburban
authorities hoping to maintain segregated neighborhoods were forced
to use class-based distinctions as a proxy for race. Though everyone
knew that race was playing a role in the formulation of suburban
zoning rules in the 1960s and 1970s, the form of the regulations
controlled only use patterns, structure types, and lot sizes, not the
appearance of those working in buildings and living in dwellings. For
those challenging zoning schemes that limited housing stocks to
those affordable by middle- and upper-class families, the decline of
overt racial classifications created new litigation challenges. Use of
civil rights laws became more difficult. In the absence of "nasty"
statements by public authorities, major obstacles arose to proving
race-based claims.33 As a result, a search began for new litigation
strategies to deal with traditional suburban antipathy to integration.
The goal, however, was still the same-to challenge the long history
of antagonism by middle- and upper-class Americans and New
Jerseyites to living in proximity with "other" citizens.34
The circumstances giving rise to the Mount Laurel litigation
itself clearly demonstrated the problem. After World War II, there
were a large number of small, rural black communities all over the
32. Residential segregation has declined a bit in the United States since 1980, but
is still significantly higher for blacks than for other groups. The United States Census
Bureau published a detailed study on this issue in 2002, which was prepared by John
Iceland and Daniel Weinberg, with assistance from Erika Steinmetz. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980-
2000 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing-patterns/
pdf/censr-3.pdf.
33. This concern became quite real two years after Mount Laurel I was decided,
when the Supreme Court required a showing of intent to prevail in a constitutional
discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), and declined to find a constitutional violation when Arlington Heights
refused to grant a variance for the construction of low-cost housing in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
After remand, Arlington Heights was settled, in part because of difficulties in using
race discrimination statutes to challenge a zoning decision. See Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979). There are settings
in which civil rights statutes may be successfully used, but the evidence of racial
action has to be pretty significant. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. The Town
of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). This case also may be read as a cautionary
tale about the ways litigation delays and long-term opposition from local governments
may frustrate the construction of subsidized housing.
34. See, e.g., Daniel Meyler, Is Growth Share Working for New Jersey, 13 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 231-239 (2010).
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eastern half of the nation. As cities and suburbs grew, many of these
communities were surrounded and often replaced by tract
developments. Mount Laurel ordered its longtime black community-
once a stop on the Underground Railroad-vacated in the 1960s
because of claims that the housing was substandard and
unsatisfactory for human habitation. Those running the town had
their eyes on the land for redevelopment. Rather than comply with
the order to leave, Ethel Lawrence and other leaders in the
community resisted, petitioned the Mount Laurel zoning authorities
for permission to build a small apartment complex to serve those to
be evicted from the local black neighborhood, and, when the petition
was opposed, joined with the local chapter of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and minority
residents of Camden to sue Mount Laurel for abusing its planning
authority. Lawrence was a day-care worker and participant in the
Burlington County Community Action Program-the local anti-
poverty agency funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. With
the help of lawyers from the Camden Regional Legal Services Agency
(another OEO funded program), lawyers donating their services, and
other volunteers, Lawrence and her colleagues mounted what
became one of the most important challenges in the history of
American land use law.35
Of necessity, the claims raised by Lawrence and her co-plaintiffs
questioned the right of Mount Laurel to bar construction of housing
suitable for occupancy by the poor and near-poor. As just noted, it
would have been illegal for the town to base its refusal to allow
construction of a subsidized housing project explicitly on racial
grounds. Not surprisingly, the town insisted that racial animus did
not motivate the structure of its land use plan.36 Rather, Mount
Laurel-to its credit in a perverse way-made the honest and
straightforward claim that it had the right to economically
discriminate in framing its land use regulations. The plaintiffs
responded with a series of arguments that the actions of Mount
Laurel were not in the public interest as required by both the state
zoning enabling laws and the state constitution.37 For these claims, it
35. FAIR SHARE HOUSING CTR., supra note 4. For a thorough history of the case,
see DAVID L. KIRP, JOHN P. DWYER & LARRY A. ROSENTHAL, OUR TOWN: RACE,
HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 61-111 (1995).
36. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336
A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. 1975).
37. The plaintiffs also made federal constitutional claims, but the New Jersey
Supreme Court declined to reach those issues. See id. at 725. On the economic issues,
that made sense. The United States Supreme Court already had declined to undertake
close scrutiny of regulations based on economic status. See San Antonio Independent
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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made no difference whether the economically deprived persons
excluded by Mount Laurel came from within its borders or from other
communities such as nearby Camden.38 The crucial issue was
whether Mount Laurel could use economic class as a central criterion
for land use regulation. On that score, the New Jersey Supreme
Court decisions in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II gave a
decisive answer-NO. "We conclude," Judge Hall wrote for the court
in Mount Laurel I,
that every [developing] municipality must, by its land use
regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an
appropriate variety and choice of housing .... [I]t cannot foreclose
the opportunity ... for low and moderate income housing and in its
regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to
the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and
prospective regional need therefor.
3 9
II. THE PROBLEM
Quarreling with the core result of Mount Laurel is difficult. It is,
after all, tawdry, unfair, and often illegal for communities to
intentionally isolate themselves from contact with a variety of people
from different classes, races, religions, or ethnicities. On the face of
it, nothing seems dramatically wrong with the decisions. Indeed, the
scope of the remedial orders made in Mount Laurel II to force
compliance by suburban communities with fair share obligations and
with duties to allow construction of least-cost housing was stunning
in its boldness and breadth.40 Few states have come close to
scrutinizing their zoning practices with the depth and sophistication
of New Jersey.41 But the original goal of the litigation-to force the
38. Perhaps the end of the Mount Laurel saga can be marked by the November
2000 opening of the Ethel Lawrence Homes, a small subsidized housing complex, in
Mount Laurel. See N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Finance Agency, A Dream Comes True,
HOME FRONT (N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Finance Agency, Trenton, NJ), Spring 2001, at 1,
available at http://www.state.nj.us/dcalhmfa/home/news/spring2001.pdf (containing a
photograph of the Ethel Lawrence Homes).
39. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724.
40. The court told lower courts to establish tight deadlines for compliance with
orders to revise zoning ordinances, to consider the appointment of masters where
necessary, and to bar construction of certain types of housing, void zoning ordinances
in their entirety, or award builder's remedies in recalcitrant communities. In addition,
the court ordered trial courts to maintain frequent contact with trial lawyers and
exercise tight control over scheduling, use of expert witnesses and discovery in land
use disputes. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456
A.2d 390, 455-59 (N.J. 1983).
41. Perhaps the best example of another jurisdiction with an interesting and often
intelligently crafted zoning system is Oregon. The legislature adopted comprehensive
statewide planning programs in the 1970s focusing in particular on preserving
agricultural land and urban planning. Though now mired in controversy over adoption
822 [Vol. 63:3
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suburbs to accept the dispersal of the poor and near-poor within their
borders-had haunting shortcomings. Though Mount Laurel
remedies have successfully forced the construction of thousands of
units of housing outside the old central cities,42 and provided decent
quarters for many people who otherwise would have been forced to
live in substandard facilities, it and its sister cases around the
country have done precious little to assist in the reconstruction of
urban America. And the present legislatively imposed regulations in
New Jersey-largely based on requiring construction of low-cost
housing in proportion to the number of regular units built--continues
long-extant incentives for suburban sprawl.43 No "reverse" Mount
Laurel doctrine has been created to control sprawl or reduce the
amount of middle- and upper-class housing construction in the
suburbs and increase it in the cities. If integration of economic
classes is good for the suburbs,44 it should be good for the cities too.
The Mount Laurel court's ringing endorsement of access by low
and moderate income citizens to "an appropriate variety and choice of
housing"45 led John Payne to make the claim in one of his last
articles that the only logical support for the result was a state
"constitutional right to shelter" for the poor and near-poor.46 What
by referendum of measures requiring more frequent compensation of landowners
negatively affected by regulations, Oregon is still a model state in many ways. For
more on the state's land use history, see David J. Boulanger, The Battle Over Property
Rights in Oregon: Measures 37 and 49 and the Need for Sustainable Land Use
Planning, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 313 (2008).
42. The Fair Share Housing Center claims that 40,000 units have been built as a
result of the cases. See FAIR SHARE HOUSING CTR., supra note 4. Though significant, it
probably is only a small fraction of the actual need for such housing in New Jersey.
43. For an analysis of this issue and suggestions on how to alter the extant
formula, see Meyler, supra note 34. Basing the formula on construction rates also
tends to misallocate fair share housing obligations: jurisdictions already housing large
numbers of poor people may end up with affordable housing obligations out of
proportion to the actual need, while suburbs with low construction rates may have
their obligations set too low. See id. at 240-47. Much of this misallocation can be
remedied by shifting to a system requiring that a percentage of each housing
development involving more than a few units be constructed as affordable housing.
Montgomery County, MD, located just outside of Washington, DC, has done that for
years-with notable success. See id. at 249-50.
44. The HOPE VI program subsidized by the federal government is part of a
growing movement based on the idea that the less well-off fare better if they live in
economically mixed neighborhoods. A description of the program may be found on the
Department of Housing and Urban Development website, About HOPE VI-Public
and Indian Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/
pih/programs/ph/hope6/aboutindex.cfm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
45. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d
713, 724 (N.J. 1975).
46. John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 555, 564 (2000).
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Payne did not do was consider the possibility that such a right has
implications far beyond the affirmative obligation of cities and towns
across New Jersey to make room for, and support, the construction of
below-market-rate housing. The housing market has always been a
creature that crosses both jurisdictional and economic boundary
lines. To limit housing stocks to the middle- and upper-classes, as
Mount Laurel and other suburban communities did, or to impose
housing obligations on one set of government entities but not on
others, had impacts elsewhere. Suburban communities competed for
good tax ratables-inviting in uses that produced good revenues and
imposed few (mostly educational) costs. This created a surplus of
land for "good" housing on large lots and "clean" businesses. On the
other hand, creating housing for the poor and near-poor outside of
center cities deepened and intensified the emptying out of cities,
created additional urban vacuums, reduced the number of potential
employees in city centers, and accentuated the concentration of the
deeply impoverished in areas left behind by middle- and upper-class
migrants to the suburbs. Though Mount Laurel remedies helped
those lucky enough to live in new, below market-rate suburban
housing, full implementation of the right to shelter for the poor and
near-poor-including integration by class-requires more than
opening up the suburbs. While it is obvious to anyone living in a
large metropolitan area that some suburbs have absorbed a
significant number of poor and low-income people in recent decades,
residential patterns still tend to be stratified by income.47 Reducing
the severity of that demographic pattern requires more than
construction of low-cost housing outside the old central cities. It also
requires reopening cities and newly impoverished suburbs to
developments housing an array of people, in addition to establishing
funding mechanisms to make routine construction of least-cost
housing possible everywhere.
The sorts of remedies used in Mount Laurel have a very different
impact in urban settings than they do in the suburbs. Indeed, a
significant part of the original debates in the litigation was about the
types of communities obligated to change their land use plans. In
Mount Laurel I, remedies were imposed on "developing
communities"-a phrase ambiguous enough to cause years of
consternation and contention.48 When Mount Laurel II was rendered
eight years later, the court reconfigured its holding, concluding that
"[e]very municipality's land use regulations should provide a realistic
47. For more on the impact of social stratification see Lee Anne Fennell, Properties
of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006); David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made
Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City
Economic Development, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427 (2000).
48. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 742-43.
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opportunity for decent housing for at least some part of its resident
poor who now occupy dilapidated housing,"49 that the "obligation to
provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of the region's present
and prospective low and moderate income housing need will no
longer be determined by whether or not a municipality is
'developing,"' and that the regional fair share "obligation extends ...
to every municipality, any portion of which is designated by the State
as a 'growth area."'so Despite this broad extension of the rule, its
practical effect, even after significant modification of the doctrine by
the state legislature, has been felt mostly outside of urban centers.
Cities automatically meet their fair share obligations by housing a
large percentage of the state's poor residents. While cities, like the
suburbs must and have accommodated the construction of below
market rate housing, the Mount Laurel rules and the successor
regulations mandated legislatively have done little to enhance other
forms of urban development. Cities need not only new and remodeled
below- market-rate housing, but also reconstruction of infrastructure,
educational systems and an urban middle class.
The problems with Mount Laurel were made most obvious by the
controversy over Regional Contribution Agreements. When the New
Jersey legislature finally stepped into the land use debates by
adopting the Fair Housing Act of 1985,51 administrative guidelines
were established for fair share obligations and the Council on
Affordable Housing was given the responsibility for issuing
affordable housing quotas over regular time intervals.52 In addition,
the act allowed communities to, in essence, purchase their way out of
least-cost housing obligations by arranging regional contribution
agreements calling for payment of fees to other, typically poorer
jurisdictions-a process repealed when the Fair Housing Act was
amended in 2008.53 These regional contribution agreements made it
feasible for many communities to skirt obligations to permit
construction of affordable housing units by providing financial
assistance for their construction elsewhere. It exemplified in a very
concrete way the tendency of the Mount Laurel system to support
49. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d
390, 418 (N.J. 1983).
50. Id.
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329.19 (West 2010).
52. The Council, however, delayed issuing the third round of rules. The courts
eventually ordered that rules be issued and invalidated some of them once they were
released. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 and 5:95 by the N.J. Council on Affordable
Hous., 914 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2007).
53. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-329.6 (West 2010). The amendments also required
that thirteen percent of all affordable housing built in the state be for very low income
residents and imposed a two and one-half percent fee on developers for use in
constructing below market rate housing. § 52:27D-329.1.
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continued clumping of the poor in central cities.
III. A "REVERSE" MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE
There are two major roadblocks to the full development of the
Mount Laurel doctrine. First, creating a right for the poor and near-
poor to reside in economically integrated communities requires
giving and enforcing the same right to those in other economic
groups. At the moment, the housing choices available to virtually
everyone-poor and non-poor-are constrained. The limitations,
however, vary enormously across economic lines. Finding ways to
reduce the differences in choice levels across class lines should be a
central goal of any mature housing policy. Second, decent housing for
poor people cannot be built without subsidies. In the absence of a
cultural commitment to provide acceptable housing to all our
citizens, the goals of Mount Laurel are a pipe dream. While there
were remedial steps the New Jersey Supreme Court could have taken
to reduce the impact of low government support on the Mount Laurel
doctrine, the justices obviously were powerless to alter some aspects
of the housing market.
Over twenty years ago, Gregory Alexander penned an intriguing
article on constraints in the housing market.54 Though he was
writing about the operation of housing markets encumbered by
servitudes, his thoughts are quite relevant to my reconsideration of
the Mount Laurel doctrine. Application of traditional economic
conceptions of a market to housing, especially developments
regulated by servitudes, Alexander argued, was inappropriate for at
least two sets of reasons. First, housing units come in packages.
Important factors like location, taxes, floor plans, schools, and
pricing-which almost everyone takes into account when buying a
place to live-cannot be easily split apart. Purchasing a residence
without accepting some sort of compromise is unusual. The
packaging problem became more serious after World War II, as the
number of condominiums, cooperatives, and subdivisions with
homeowner association governing structures ballooned.55 While
54. Gregory Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 883 (1988).
55. According to the 2007 American Housing Survey for the United States, there
were 8,445,000 condominium and 848,000 cooperative housing units in the nation. See
American Housing Survey for the United States: 2007, Table 1A-1: Introductory
Characteristics - All Housing Units, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs07/ahsO7.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). That is a dramatic
increase from the 4.8 million condo units that existed in 1990 and the 2.2 million a
decade earlier. The most dramatic increase was in the Northeast, where the number of
condominium units increased by 263.4 percent between 1980 and 1990. In New Jersey,
the increase was an extraordinary 316.4 percent in only ten years. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL BRIEF: CONDOMINIUMS (1994), available at http://www.census.
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buyers may have preferences about location, layout, and other
standard factors that they can largely satisfy if their economic status
presents them with an array of options, typical servitude packages
substantially reduce the range of options available to even wealthy
purchasers. Housing choice, in short, is routinely constrained.
Second, servitudes impose long-term obligations. Even if a home
buyer fully understands and agrees with the terms and priorities of a
servitude package at the moment of purchase, the rules of the game
may change over time as new boards come and go, regulations are
amended, occupants change, and the building complex is altered. The
only way to rid oneself of unwanted shifts in policy is to sell and then
be constrained anew by the limited sorts of housing packages
available in the market. Given the millions of Americans now living
in developments with homeowner associations, the impact of
servitudes on the structure of the housing market has become very
significant.
The sorts of market limitations described by Alexander do not
operate the same across all economic classes. For the very rich,
choices certainly are broader than for others. The well-to-do are
likely to have the option of staying put or renting temporary housing
while they look for a permanent place to live. They have the luxury of
an array of choices of neighborhood, housing type, unit size, aesthetic
ambiance, and cost. If they do not wish to live in a development run
by a homeowner's association, that option probably is available. But
if the well-to-do wish to live in a highly urbanized area, their choices
may be much more limited than those available outside of center
cities. Though some major cities like New York and Chicago have a
large and growing stock of center city housing for the middle- and
upper-classes, New Jersey cities largely lacked that amenity until
quite recently.56 It is a continuing and telling reminder of the impact
gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb94_1 1.pdf.
56. Hoboken, just across the river from Manhattan and only one subway stop
away, is the most important exception. It began to gentrify in the 1970s and is now a
fairly wealthy community. Jersey City, a much larger city just to the southwest of
Hoboken, and also within easy reach of Manhattan by subway, began the same process
a bit later and now has significant areas of remodeled housing. New Brunswick, a
smaller city benefitted by the presence of the main campus of Rutgers University and
a train station on the main line to New York, has also seen a significant amount of
housing rehabilitation and construction in recent years. The first new apartment units
for higher income groups in Newark were recently opened in remodeled buildings near
the main train station. Some once-troubled suburbs of Newark, most notably
Montclair, have also become popular in recent years. But almost all of this
gentrification has been due to standard economic forces, not land use planning
decisions. And most of this change has done nothing to enhance economic integration
in center cities. It has served to replace impoverished communities rather than
establish newly vibrant, economically integrated neighborhoods-the ultimate goal of
the Mount Laurel cases.
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of income stratification in American life.
At the opposite end of the economic spectrum, choice may be
virtually absent. The existence of waiting lists to get into public
housing facilities and Section 8 housing voucher programs is a stark
indication of the plight of the impoverished. Some of the waiting lists,
especially for large public housing authorities, are enormous and
largely composed of extremely low-income households. Data for 2003
and 2004 suggest that over one million families were on housing
voucher waiting lists and over one and one-half million were in line
for public housing units.57 Many housing authorities have established
priority systems to divvy up their available units, with people losing
housing involuntarily because of fires or other emergencies, victims
of domestic violence, working families, or the disabled at the top of
the list. These house seekers are left to living with friends or
relatives, scrounging for any available housing unit or living on the
streets. While the Mount Laurel decisions contained much language
evincing sympathy for the poor and near-poor, the remedies do little
to provide the housing choices they need, regardless of where they
wish to live.58
Reducing the vast difference in choice levels across economic
classes clearly is an unmet goal of the Mount Laurel courts. Given
the breadth of the remedies imposed upon communities, requiring
them to accept their fair share of least-cost housing, it is surprising
that other steps were not taken. Several possibilities come to mind.
First, developers of market-rate housing in any community should be
required to offer a share of the units they build as below-market-rate
residences. Second, those erecting commercial developments likely to
require a range of employees should be required to either build, or
pay a fee so others may build, a range of housing units for the
workers. Finally, and most importantly, obligations to accept least-
cost housing should be paired with limitations on zoning for more
expensive dwellings and clean businesses. If the goal is to reduce
income stratification, then continuing to allow towns to over-zone for
57. And this is only for agencies with more than 250 housing units. Smaller public
housing authorities are not obligated to report waiting list data to the government. For
more on this report, see NATIONAL Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION, RESEARCH NOTE
#04-03: A LOOK AT WAITING LISTS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE HUD APPROVED
ANNUAL PLAN? (2004), available at http://www.nlihc.org/docl04-03.pdf.
58. Newark's public housing authority closed its waiting list to new applicants
eight years ago. At one time the list contained more than 19,000 applicants. In 2010,
the housing authority spent an influx of Section 8 funds to empty the list. That,
however, only means that it will now be reopened for new applicants and is expected to
grow again, at least for a time. And there is no guarantee that a voucher recipient will
be able to find a fully satisfactory place to live. See David Giambusso, Newark Unlocks
a Door for Needy Residents, City Plans to Empty Long Section 8 Waiting List, STAR-
LEDGER, June 17, 2010, at 17.
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typical suburban housing and prime commercial development is
untenable. Some of those projects need to be pushed into other
communities.
The Mount Laurel II court required communities to use
inclusionary zoning techniques to include least-cost housing in their
land use schemes. Among those mentioned were incentive zoning and
mandatory set-asides.59 The first grants developers greater square
footage and density levels in return for the construction of least-cost
housing units. The second simply requires construction of a certain
percentage of least-cost units in every residential development. But
neither was made mandatory. The exact nature of the affirmative
steps to be taken by each community was left open for later
discussion. The result has been that few communities have taken
serious, meaningful steps to adopt genuinely inclusionary plans.
That is unfortunate. Schemes with teeth work, as demonstrated by
Montgomery County, Maryland-a recognized leader in the area-
and dozens of other communities around the country. In Montgomery
County, the moderately priced dwelling unit program requires that
twelve and one-half percent to fifteen percent of all units in a
development with twenty or more residences be made available to
residents earning sixty-five percent or less of the median income in
the county. In return, developers gain a twenty-two percent increase
in normally available density levels. If units are sold at below-market
rates rather than rented, they may be sold by their owners at market
rates after ten years. But half of the "windfall" profits obtained at
such sales must be paid to the county to assist in the construction of
additional projects. Thousands of units, including a significant
number run by public housing agencies and non-profit groups, have
been built since the program's inception in 1974. Developers in the
area strongly opposed the program during deliberations over its
creation. They now embrace it, and encouraged adoption of similar
programs in neighboring jurisdictions.6
0 The entire state of New
Jersey should be operating under a similar plan.61 It would both
substantially increase the number of below-market-rate housing
59. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laurel 11), 456 A.2d
390, 445-46 (N.J. 1983).
60. The first units mandated by the program became available in 1976. Over
twelve thousand units were constructed by 2005. For a more complete history of the
program, see The History of the MPDU Program in Montgomery County, MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, MD, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhctmpl.asp?url=/content/dhcal
housing/housingP/mpdulhistory.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). See also Jay
Walljasper, A Fair Share in Suburbia, 268 THE NATION 15 (1999).
61. There is no reason to exclude urban areas from such a scheme. As
gentrification spreads across the Northeast, housing available for the poor and near-




units constructed and establish a long-term system for financing
housing for those needing deep assistance in order to afford a place to
live.
The great wave of migration to the suburbs after World War II
was facilitated and heavily subsidized by three important
developments: (1) construction of the interstate highway system; (2)
installation of sewer systems and water treatment facilities,
stretching far from city centers;62 and (3) the movement of many
businesses outside urban cores. The first two, heavily-subsidized by
federal grants, made both residential and business development
much more plausible and affordable. The heavy infusion of public
funds into the construction of highways and sewers suggests that
both commercial and residential housing developers should provide
some recompense to the public for the tax funds used to support their
projects. Most large commercial projects draw not only white-collar
employees, but an array of service workers, clean-up crews, low-paid
staff, and others who might like to live closer to work. A fee based on
the cost of the project would go a long way toward helping to pay for
their housing. Funds produced by such fees, together with those paid
in from sales of houses built under inclusionary zoning schemes,
would have a significant impact on the public's ability to construct
publicly supported housing projects. While the New Jersey Supreme
Court may not impose such fees itself, it may invalidate any land use
scheme lacking such a program.63 And the state legislature, of course,
could require the use of such programs statewide.
Neither inclusionary zoning nor development fees require a
proper balance in the sorts of land uses permitted under local zoning
schemes. Though land must be made available for least cost housing
under Mount Laurel, nothing prevents a community from continuing
its prior efforts to attract projects that produce good tax revenues
and require low levels of public expenditures. Indeed, if economic
incentives operate at even a minimal level in the politics of the
zoning "market," such behavior should be expected. But that does not
mean the courts need to allow its continuance. In order for all
communities in the state to operate properly, funding sources need to
be spread fairly. Allowing the zoning market to operate unchecked
exacerbates wide differences in property tax rates and monetary
resources (including that for subsidized housing) among government
62. There is a large body of literature on suburban development after World War
II. The classic book is JACKSON, supra note 6. For more recent commentary, see
generally RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
(2005) and the review of Dilworth, Nicole S. Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia, 90
MINN. L. REV. 459 (2005).
63. The court has exercised similar powers. See Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129
(N.J. 1976).
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entities. Simply put, Mount Laurel will not work well if it is limited
to rules requiring acceptance of a fair share of least-cost housing. All
communities should be required both to accept least-cost housing and
to limit the amount of land available for middle- and upper-class
residential and commercial development.
It is perfectly clear that the Mount Laurel I and II courts were
aware of this problem. The multi-layered case of Robinson v. Cahill,64
which invalidated the then-extant system for funding public schools,
was in dispute in the same period Mount Laurel was evolving. While
not invalidating reliance on property taxes to pay for some local
education expenses, the court did require state intervention to
significantly reduce the disparity in funds available to serve children
in various communities. The state was free to delegate to local
jurisdictions both the operation and funding of schools, but the court
was unprepared to allow such an atomized system to continue
without efforts to equalize per pupil expenditures across the state.6 5
The court could have crafted a similar result in Mount Laurel by
requiring a greater level of statewide uniformity in zoning practices
and requiring a significant reallocation of land use priorities at all
economic levels of the housing supply chain.
The similarity of the issues in the zoning and school funding
cases adds further power to the argument that the remedies imposed
by Mount Laurel were too limited. Both involved highly localized
systems for providing and regulating allocation of resources-land
for housing in one case and taxes for education in the other. Since the
1920s, when states adopted zoning acts granting cities and towns the
authority to zone and that devolution of power was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler,66 state
governments largely stayed out of routine land use disputes.
Similarly, operating public schools and raising property taxes for
their support was long a function of local communities. Both land use
and school-funding decisions made by one jurisdiction had significant
effects on other locations. Land use patterns favoring the well-to-do
64. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson II), 306 A.2d 605 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson Ill), 335 A.2d 6
(N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v.
Cahill (Robinson V), 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976). A related series of cases were decided
later reaffirming the notion that some school districts provided inadequate education
and requiring additional remedies. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J.
1985); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
Ill), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997);
Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), M-1293-09, 2011 WL 1990554 (N.J. May 24, 2011).
65. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 273.
66. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a look at the history of Euclid and its nativist




and good business uses enhanced the quality of schools in suburban
communities and reduced the ability of poorer communities to
maintain high-quality educational programs. Land use and school-
funding systems, even though run by different political operatives,
were highly coherent in their overall goals. Both favored "high
quality" residents with few children and white-collar businesses.
These uses produced "nice" neighborhoods and business areas that
demanded low-level government expenditures and produced
significant tax receipts. If the obligation under the state constitution
to pay for a "thorough and efficient" education must be shared across
communities,67 then a similar obligation to share both the benefits
and burdens of various segments of the housing market should have
been imposed.68
It is not difficult to implement such a zoning duty. First, and
most obviously, if a fair share system can be established for least-cost
housing, it can also be set up for other land uses. That should be
done, and zoning ordinances should be required to conform to the fair
share usage plans. Second, "leap frog" development must be
drastically curtailed. More than any other feature of contemporary
land use practice, the ability of developers to purchase and build on
cheaper land on the outskirts of suburbia significantly reduces the
incentives to invest in more urbanized neighborhoods, increases
sprawl, and limits the availability of housing for middle- and upper-
class people in more densely populated urban areas. The overall goal
should be to force infill development to occur before new areas are
opened for urbanization.69 Requiring adoption of statewide planning
mechanisms to implement such planning techniques should have
been a central feature of the Mount Laurel decisions.
Finally, the two large shortcomings in Mount Laurel noted
here-the failure to impose limits on "surplus" zoning for prime
development and the lack of strong inclusionary zoning remedies-
are not without their downside in the present political environment.
If such techniques work, development on the outskirts of urban areas
will decline and infill development will increase. As the amount of
land available for development or redevelopment in more densely
populated areas declines, it will go up in price. There has to be some
67. See N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, cl. 1.
68. Interestingly, neither the Robinson nor Mt. Laurel lines of cases were decided
as equal protection cases. See supra notes 1 and 64 and accompanying text. The former
was resolved under the "thorough and efficient" education clause of the state
constitution and the latter as a matter of the scope of the police power to enact
legislation for the benefit of the public. Id.
69. Portland, Oregon is famous for its zoning plan that makes development on
agricultural land on the city's outskirts very difficult. Infill development has become
commonplace. For more on Portland, see generally Boulanger, supra note 41.
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triggering mechanism to reduce such pressure by opening
agricultural land for development on the edges of urban areas. But
the cost of inner city land inevitably will rise over time, placing
pressure on housing prices for the middle class and making
construction of subsidized housing more difficult. So we circle back to
the issue raised at the beginning of this section of the essay-the
need for mechanisms to fund least-cost housing. In the long run, we
will not only need to control the resale prices of least-cost housing,
recapture profits from those who purchased below market rate
housing, and impose development fees on some projects, but we also
will need ongoing, substantial commitments from both federal and
state governments to help build housing for the poor and near-poor.
That commitment has been sorely lacking in the last thirty years.
70
And without a revival of interest in such funding programs,
everything written here and elsewhere about planning housing for all
Americans will be for naught.71 I am sure John Payne would agree.
70. Budgets for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development were cut
dramatically during the Reagan years and have never fully recovered despite an
increase in demand for subsidized housing. The American Enterprise Institute reports
that Reagan was the only President to cut the HUD budget since 1963, slashing it over
forty percent in his second term. See Veronique de Rugy, President Reagan, Champion
Budget Cutter, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH (June 9, 2004),
http://www.aei.org/paper/20675. As reported by the National Housing Institute, HUD
took the largest hit among federal, non-defense departments during the Reagan years.
See Peter Dreier, Reagan's Legacy: Homelessness in America, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE
(Nat'l Hous. Inst.), May/June 2004, available at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/135/
reagan.html.
71. That is especially so in New Jersey where the present governor has voiced
strong opposition to the Mount Laurel and school funding decisions and hostility to the
judges who decided them. See, e.g., Kevin D. Walsh, On the Front Lines of New Jersey's
Mount Laurel Decision, 20 POVERTY & RACE 9 (2011); Lisa Fleisher, Gov. Christie
Proposes Eliminating Affordable Housing Quotas, Fees, STAR-LEDGER, May 13, 2010,
available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssfl2010/05/gov chrischristie-proposes
el.html.
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